Investor relations (IR) are costly activities, and a widely held view is that firms undertake them to increase share price over time. However, Hong and Huang (2005) assert that IR is undertaken for the personal benefit of insiders with large ownership stakes. We test Hong and Hong (2005) empirically, specifically by investigating the association between the activities of newly listed firms and insider equity ownership, as well as insider sales. The results support Hong and Huang's predictions where these firms are more likely to engage in broker presentations when insiders have a valuable ownership stake. Furthermore, when insiders sell a large portion of their shares, firms undertake different types of group presentations.
Introduction
We investigate the relationship between the investor relations (IR) practices of newly listed firms, and their insider equity ownership. IR are activities undertaken by firms to communicate with analysts, investors and institutions (Marston & Straker 2001 ) and the widely held view is that these activities increase share price through either voluntary disclosure or by improving company visibility (Diamond & Verrecchia 1991; Merton 1987) .
IR has emerged in recent years as an important part of the strategic management process (Bragg 2010) . In Australia, the increasing importance of IR has led to the establishment of the Australasian Investor Relations Association (AIRA) and a set of best practice guidelines.
A recent survey of 150 IR practitioners employed in ASX 200 companies documented that 64% of respondents intend to allocate more time to IR activities in 2011 (AIRA 2011).
However IR is no free lunch, being a costly and complex discipline. Hong and Huang (2005) estimated that between 20-25% of the CEO's time and approximately 50% of the CFO's time is devoted to IR in small and newly listed companies.
In light of these costs, attempts have been made to explain investment in IR. Merton (1987) argued that IR improves company visibility among analysts and institutions, while according to Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) , IR is a form of voluntary disclosure which decreases adverse selection costs to trading. Both however make the prediction that IR leads to an appreciation in share price. Yet the empirical evidence does not fully support a positive association between IR and share price. In particular, Dennis (1973) finds no link between IR and long term share prices, and the evidence of an association between IR and the cost of capital (Botosan, 1997; Botosan and Plumlee; is at best, mixed.
However Richardson, Teoh and Wysocki (2004) document that the personal incentives of insiders may play a role in determining a company's IR activities. 1 Drawing on this evidence as well as that previously discussed, Hong and Huang (2005) challenged the view that IR leads to an appreciation in share price. They argue that firms undertake IR to enhance the liquidity of the blockholdings of insiders. Therefore IR may not necessarily lead to an increase in share price and is in fact used for insiders' personal benefit. Hong and Huang pointed to small and newly listed companies where insiders often have sizeable personal wealth vested as equity and their shares are inherently illiquid. They predict that insiders in such circumstances are likely to influence IR activity to improve secondary market liquidity.
2 This is because they may need to sell equity, and without any improvement in liquidity, their trades are likely to have a large price impact. Fundamentally, Hong and Huang predict that the insiders' personal incentives play a role in the determination of IR policy.
We test the predictions of Hong and Huang (2005) on the association between the IR activities of newly listed firms, and their insider equity ownership, as well as insider sales.
Equity ownership shows for insiders' intention to sell, while their actual sales are manifestations of this intention. Both the intention and its operationalisation are examined.
We examine all group presentations (IR activities), made by newly listed firms over a five year period post listing. Group presentations are defined as "when one or more listed companies present their investment cases to a group of prospective investors, analysts or other market participants" (Demos & Marston 2010, p. 64) . The types of group presentations include analyst, broadcast, broker, investor, and conference and road show presentations.
Group presentations are a unique form of IR, as they are not linked to major announcements such as the release of earnings, and occur in a physical setting which allows face to face interactions between management and attendees (Bushee, Jung & Miller 2010) . Further, they are often initiated by management, and the directors are heavily involved in both initiation and presentation (Demos & Marston 2010) . Together, this suggests that group presentations are discretionary, and may be influenced by directors who are conscious of their personal
incentives.
There has been recent interest in group presentations (Bushee, Jung & Miller 2009; Bushee, Jung & Miller 2010; Demos & Marston 2010; Ferguson & Scott 2011) , but despite this, group presentations are yet to be extensively examined in Australia. In a review of financial reports for the year ended 30 June 2010, the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) commented that "Most entities provided more analysis in investor presentations or analyst briefings lodged with ASX (Australian Securities Exchange).
Directors should consider giving more detail in the OFR (Operating and Financial Reviews), which is part of the annual report." (ASIC 2010, p. 1).
Two questions are addressed in this study. First, are newly listed firms in which insiders own a sizeable equity stake more likely to perform group presentations? Second, are newly listed firms in which directors sell their equity share more likely to perform group presentations?
Using data over a six year period extending from January 2005 to December 2010, the results are mixed. While firms in which insiders have a sizeable ownership stake are not more likely to perform any group presentations, they are more likely to perform a particular type of presentation, being broker presentations. Broker presentations are used to convey the 'investment story' or value propositions of a company (Demos & Marston 2010) . The evidence therefore suggests that the intention of the insiders to sell may induce firms to use broker presentations to increase trading, leading to an increase in liquidity.
However, the association between insider sales and the likelihood of a firm performing group presentations tells a different story. First, firms in which insiders sell a large value of equity are more likely to perform group presentations. However, they are not more likely to perform any individual type of group presentation. Nevertheless, the evidence documented in the study supports Hong and Huang's (2005) predictions. Insiders in newly listed firms take their personal incentives into consideration when determining IR policy. Firms may invest in IR to the point where the marginal costs exceed the marginal benefits. When this happens, the majority of shareholders lose, while the insiders benefit. This is because overinvestment in IR improves liquidity for the benefit of the insiders, although the majority of shareholders, with their dispersed holdings, care little about the liquidity of their holdings (Hong & Huang 2005) .
Considered in this light, the study raises the question of whether insiders in newly listed companies place their personal ahead of other shareholders. The implications of the study therefore relate to agency theory as articulated in Amihud and Lev (1981) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) . Empirically, the study is closest to May (1995) and Tufano (1996) , who document that firms in which CEOs hold large equity stakes are more likely to engage in diversifying acquisitions and hedging strategies. Both of these activities decrease their personal risk, but are also counter to the best interests of all shareholders as they destroy company value.
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The remainder of the study is organised as follows: Section 2 discusses prior work and hypotheses while the sample and method are in Section 3. The results are presented in Section 4 with Section 5 concluding the study.
Prior work and hypotheses
We initially examine whether newly listed firms where insiders own a sizeable equity stake are more likely to perform group presentations. Next, the investigation continues to whether firms where directors sell their sales are more likely to perform group presentations. The questions are similar, in that the first uses ownership as a proxy for the intention to sell, while the second examines selling transaction as the operationalisation of the intention. Both questions assess the predictions of Hong and Huang (2005) . Fundamentally, Hong and Huang predict that the personal incentives of insiders determine the IR activities of newly listed companies. More specifically, they argue that insiders in newly listed companies often own sizeable equity stakes that are inherently illiquid. They suggest that this equity stake may represent a sizeable portion of directors' personal wealth, such that if they experience a personal liquidity shock, they may be required to sell equity on market. Yet, given the illiquidity inherent in newly listed firms, selling by insiders is likely to have a substantial price impact. Under such circumstances, they may use IR to generate liquidity, in an attempt to mitigate the price impact of their trades. Hence, both the equity ownership of insiders and their sales are positively associated with the IR activities. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that if managers have too much equity, they may invest in projects that diversify their personal stake, but also reduce company value. Accordingly, May (1995) finds that companies in which CEOs have a higher level of personal wealth tied up as equity are more likely to pursue acquisitions that reduce equity variance. Tufano (1996) also documents a positive association between hedging strategies by gold companies, and the size of the equity stake owned by the CEO.
Therefore following Hong and Huang's prediction that IR is positively associated with the ownership of the directors, insiders in small and medium sized firms initiate and perform group presentations (Demos and Marston, 2010) and CEOs with large equity stakes consider personal risk when making decisions that affect company risk (value), the first hypothesis is stated as:
There is a positive association between insider ownership and the likelihood of newly listed firms performing group presentations.
The second question examines whether firms in which insiders sell their equity are more likely to perform group presentations. Richardson et al. (2004) 
Research Method
The first question examines the association between director ownership and the likelihood of newly listed firms performing group presentations and model is as follows: 
Data collection
The SIRCA Australian Company Announcements (ACA) database is used to collect company announcements of group presentations. All company announcements from the beginning of 2006 to the end of 2010 are filtered by the categories 'Progress Reports' and 'Other'. Filtered announcements are individually assessed to determine whether they pertain to group presentations. Presentations performed at either an annual general meeting or an extraordinary general meeting are excluded. 7 The remaining announcements are used to construct the dependent count variables described below.
Number of all group presentations
The variable PRESENT represents the number of all group presentations made by a company for the five year period ending 2010. The variable does not distinguish between different types of group presentations.
Number of types of group presentations
The variables ANLST_PRES, BROAD, BROKER, CONF, INVEST and RDSHW represent the number of analyst, broadcast, broker, conference, investor and road show presentations made by a company for the five year period ending 2010. The categorisation of presentations according to these types is based Demos and Marston (2010, p. 64) . Broadcast and road show presentations are additions to this table, and the rational for their inclusion is described below.
Analyst presentations
Analyst presentations (ANLST_PRES) occur at events that are typically organised by either the IR department of a company, or a professional body of analysts (Demos & Marston 2010 ). At such events, similar sized companies in the same industry present to an audience of analysts. Participating companies provide analysts with information regarding financial results and projections of future performance, assisting analysts in generating timely and accurate forecasts (Lane & Orgeron 1992) .
Broadcast presentations
Broadcast presentations (BROAD) are standalone webcasts and radio interviews, and are not the rebroadcasts of other group presentations. This classification is novel to the study, and is loosely based on the classification 'Webcasts of IR Meetings/Presentations' in Spaseska (2008) . Yet BROAD differs from this classification as it captures standalone broadcast presentations, i.e. dedicated presentations that do not rebroadcast prior group presentations.
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The rational for this distinction is twofold. First, the pilot study identifies the prevalence of standalone broadcast presentations. 9 Second, the distinction avoids double counting.
Examples of broadcast presentations include interviews with senior management and panel discussions.
Broker presentations
Broker presentations (BROKER) occur at events where four or five firms present their investment cases, colloquially known as a company 'story' (Demos & Marston 2010) .
Although broker and analyst events are logistically similar, the emphasis of the presentations at these events differs. Instead of financials and forecasts, broker presentations emphasise a companies' story or value proposition (Bushee, Jung & Miller 2010) .
Conference presentations
Conference presentations (CONF) are made at conferences held on one or across many days.
Conferences can be industry specific, market capitalisation specific or financial intermediary specific. 10 Diggers and Dealers is an example of an industry specific conference, and is an annual mining conference held in Kalgoorlie Western Australia. 11 Conferences are typically invitation only and attendees include institutional investors, analysts, bankers, the media and corporate finance professionals (Demos & Marston 2010) . In accordance with the diverse backgrounds of conference attendees, conference presentations typically emphasis a company's story, as opposed to detailed financial analysis (Bushee, Jung & Miller 2010) .
Investor presentations
Investor presentations (INVEST) are presentations made to update a firm's existing investor base (Demos & Marston 2010) . In these presentations, senior management presents results, prospects and strategy. In terms of the content, investor presentations are therefore similar to analyst presentations.
Road show presentations
Road shows (RDSHW) are usually a series of meetings in which senior management present to a variety of audiences for the purpose of raising capital (a deal road show), or to hold 10 Financial intermediary specific refers to conferences organized exclusively for the clients of a particular financial intermediary. 11 In 2011, Diggers and Dealers ran for three days with 2250 delegates in attendance. Presentations were made by 37 ASX listed mining companies across the three days.
discussions with current and potential investors (non-deal road show) (Bragg 2010) . Road show presentations therefore emphasis a company's 'story', and content wise they are similar to broker presentations. It is important to note however that the expense of an ongoing road show can be considerable. They range from two or three days events in one country, to month long trips to financial centres around the world (Bushee & Miller 2007) . For the point of this study therefore, road shows are a discretionary and expensive type of group presentation. ratios. This suggests that the write downs in shareholders' equity in 2009 may have been so substantial (as illustrated by the negative average leverage) that firms were forced to issue cheap equity (low P2B).
Descriptive statistics
<insert Table 2 here>
Results

Insider ownership and group presentations
H1 predicts a positive association between insider ownership at listing date and the likelihood of a firm performing group presentations. Univariate analysis comparing firms where insiders sold equity at least once in the five year period to those in which there were no sales showed that the former have significantly larger equity ownership (ED_OWN and ED_VAL). This result confirms Hong and Huang's (2005) predictions that insiders with sizeable equity positions are more likely to sell at some point in the life cycle of the firm.
Firms in which insiders sell also have higher price to book ratios and lower leverage. This may indicate that the uncertainty surrounding the value of growth firms that are unable to borrow (due to an uncertain valuation), induces insiders to sell, when possible. These firms also have a higher percentage of firms subject to escrow. This could show that firms where insiders have a high propensity to sell (such as growth companies with uncertain value) are more likely to enforce an escrow.
The regression results are presented in Table 3 . Insider ownership is not associated with group presentations with no significant coefficients in all three models. A possible explanation for this insignificant relationship is that newly listed companies prefer to use cheaper, easier and more direct forms of IR. 14 Bushee and Miller (2007) point to press releases and positive announcements for companies embarking on an IR strategy, a process they term "waking up dormant investors" (Bushee & Miller 2007, p. 11) . Furthermore, although Demos and Marston (2010) find that all small companies in their sample perform group presentations and the CEO, CFO and IRO are heavily involved in these presentations, they do not specify the average age of these firms.
Therefore, the insignificant coefficients on ED_OWN and ED_VAL may be an artefact of the lifecycle of firms in the sample. Newly listed firms may lack the resources, expertise and visibility to perform group presentations.
<insert Table 3 here> Consistent with expectations, firms followed by more analysts (ANALYST) are more likely to perform group presentations. However the association is not statistically significant.
Similarly, Demos and Marston (2010) also find no difference in analyst following for firms listed on the Athens Stock Exchange that participate in group presentations and those that do not. Defining characteristics of firms in their sample include: modest market capitalisation, lack of liquidity and low market visibility, not dissimilar to the characteristics of the newly listed companies. More broadly, Bushee and Miller's (2007) survey of professionals involved 14 Bragg (2010) argues that group presentations are the most expensive part of a firm's IR budget.
in the IR of small and medium sized companies indicate that that they view attracting analysts as an unrealistic goal for companies beginning their IR strategy.
EXTRACT is the only significant variable to be associated with the number of group presentations in the expected direction. Ferguson and Scott (2011) argue that the value of firms in extractive industries is derived from technical geological information and this information requires interpretation by management. They suggest that group presentations are a suitable forum for managers in extractive companies to convey such in depth analysis.
To determine the relationship between the likelihood of a firm performing a particular type of group presentation, and director ownership, Eq. (1) is re-estimated using the number of each type of group presentation as the dependent variable. Akaike information criterion (AIC) is used to assess the three models estimated in Table 4 to determine the most appropriate specification for these models. The model with ED_VAL is found to be the most appropriate in terms of parsimony and goodness of fit.
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Six models are estimated employing the dependent count variables ANLST_PRES, BROAD, BROKER, CONF, INVEST and RDSHW. The larger the dollar value of equity held by insiders (ED_VAL), the less likely firms are to perform analyst and conference presentations.
But for both ANLST_PRES and CONF, the estimated coefficient for ED_VAL is insignificant.
Similarly, but in the opposite direction, ED_VAL is not significantly associated with the likelihood of performing broadcast (BROAD), investor (INVEST) and road show (RDSW)
presentations. However, firms in which insiders have a large ownership stake (ED_VAL) are more likely to perform broker (BROKER) presentations. This result is significant at the 1% level, and provides support for H1.
Highly levered firms (D2E) are more likely to use broadcast (BROAD) presentations. It is important to note that BROAD refers to broadcasts presentations independent of other group presentations. 16 The pilot study revealed that these presentations were typically webcasts or audio interviews with senior management. Viewed in this light, such presentations are cheap and easy to arrange, as they are not performed in a physical setting. The positive association between BROAD and D2E is therefore consistent with the explanation of companies with limited resources utilising cheap forms of IR.
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Firms in extractive industries (EXTRACT) are more likely to use conference (CONF) and investor (INVEST) presentations, significant at the 10% and 5% levels respectively. "A typical resource investor presentation does not have an earnings focus. Instead managers discuss the prospectively of tenement portfolios, key project progression and milestone accomplishment along the mine development lifecycle" (Ferguson and Scott, 2011, p. 3) They also make special distinction of the importance of conference presentations to the mining industry.
EQUITY is positively associated with the likelihood of performing investor presentations, (INVEST), significant at the 5% level, and may be explained by the use of investor presentations (INVEST) to coerce investor participation in equity issues. In untabulated analysis, the types of equity issues shown to be significantly associated with the likelihood of performing investor presentations (INVEST) are placements (PLACE) and share purchase plans (SPP). According to Lee and Kocher (2011) <insert Tables 5 and 6 here>
Conclusions
We document an association between the IR activities of newly listed firms, and the equity ownership and selling activities of their insiders. IR involves interactions with analysts, institutions and investors, and the widely held view is that these activities lead to an appreciation in share price. Yet mixed empirical evidence of a causal relationship between IR and share price led Hong and Huang (2005) to challenge this view. They argue that it is the insiders' personal incentives that determine IR policy. Insiders, particularly those in newly listed firms, have an incentive to use IR to improve liquidity. This is because they often own large holdings of equity that are difficult to sell due to the illiquidity inherent in such firms.
This study assesses two predictions emanating from Hong and Huang (2005) . The first is that the intention of insiders to sell, as proxied by their ownership stake, induces firms to undertake IR. The second prediction is that firms are more likely to undertake IR if directors sell equity. To assess these predictions, a sample is constructed using IPOs on the ASX The findings reiterate the complex motives of firms in undertaking IR. While for some IR may be used to increase share price, the results suggest that this is certainly not the case for all firms. Particularly telling of this is the evidence that the IR activities of newly listed firms are influenced by the personal incentives of its insiders. More broadly however, the implications of this study extend to agency theory. Insiders in newly listed firms, cognisant of their personal risk (illiquid equity stake), may overinvest in IR for their personal benefit (to increase liquidity). This may be detrimental to firm value as IR activities, particularly group presentations, are costly, and any increase in liquidity bought about by IR may not be valued by the majority of shareholders, who hold dispersed equity stakes.
There are several limitations in our study. The first is that no proxy for the personal wealth of insiders is included. Hong and Huang (2005) assume that insiders in newly listed companies have a considerable portion of their personal wealth tied up in company equity. Agrawal and Mandelker (1987) and May (1995) have examined the ratio of equity wealth to cumulative cash compensation earned throughout the career of a CEO, to proxy for their personal wealth.
Yet such an approach is problematic here, as historical data on the cash compensation of insiders in newly listed companies is sparse. This is because they may have held no prior directorships, and in the case that they have, it is difficult to track these directorships through time and obtain a comprehensive dataset. Furthermore, we do not include the personal wealth of insiders in the form of stock options. Yet they may hold large portfolios of options, particularly in newly listed firms that have a mandate for growth.
Greater insight into the predictions of Hong and Huang (2005) may be gained by examining if the positive association between the IR activities of newly listed firms and the personal incentives of insiders is detrimental to company value. Hong and Huang (2005) argue that firms may overinvest in IR to increase liquidity for the benefit of insiders, but suggest that this increase may be of no benefit to the majority of shareholders with dispersed ownership stakes. In Australian however, a large fraction of newly listed firms have small market capitalisations, and experience thin trading. As a result, shareholders may value liquidity as much as insiders. Therefore, investing in IR for the purpose of increasing liquidity may not be detrimental to firm value.
It would be beneficial for future research to assess the content of group presentations. Two points motivate such research. First, the comments by ASIC questioning the role of group presentations refers to the analysis provided in presentations, not the frequency with which they are performed in Australia. Second, in a recent study, Ferguson and Scott (2011) point to the detailed analysis management can provide investors in the form of group presentations.
An investigation into the content of group presentations may yield a more comprehensive understanding of how and why a broad spectrum of Australian firms use this discretionary, and costly form of IR. ' refers to the expected sign of the co-efficient. 'LR Chi Squared' refers to the likelihood ratio Chi-square test that all the variables equal zero. All models have 14 degrees of freedom. The absolute value of z statistics are in parentheses. Significance levels are based on one tailed t tests for the variable of interest SALE_VAL, and two tailed tests for all other variables. The symbols *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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